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YOUNG V. HAWAII: A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT 
Michael Jimenez* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is no surprise that firearms possession is the subject of much 
debate in the United States. Since 1966, there have been over 150 mass 
shootings where the shooter or shooters killed four or more people.1 
While mass shootings are some of the most visible incidents of gun 
violence, they account for only a fraction of the number of gun-related 
incidents each year.2 At the time of writing, the United States has seen 
69,081 gun-related incidents in 2019 alone.3 While gun violence is not 
a novel phenomenon, the magnitude of this problem is unique to the 
United States.4 Despite the availability of this sobering data, American 
lawmakers have been unsuccessful at combatting these rising 
numbers, perhaps due to varying interpretations of the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. What is more, vague 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
University of California Los Angeles, June 2014. Thank you to Professor Allan Ides for your advice 
and support; this Comment would not have been possible without your insight as an expert in 
constitutional law. To the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, thank you for 
your time, care, and precision in editing this Comment. To my parents Clemente and Kathy 
Jimenez, I could never fully express my gratitude for your endless support of my educational and 
professional endeavors. 
 1. Bonnie Berkowitz & Chris Alcantara, The Terrible Numbers That Grow with Each Mass 
Shooting, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mass-shootings-
in-america/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c9b6c2ffbfcf (last updated Dec. 18, 2019). 
 2. Compare EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1 
(2019), https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Gun_Violence-America-
REPORT-040919A.pdf  (the average numbers of gun deaths and injuries per year are 36,383 and 
100,120, respectively), with Ten Years of Mass Shootings in the United States, 
EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://everytownresearch.org/massshootingsreports/mass-shootings-in-america-2009-2019 (in 
2017, mass shootings accounted for 159 deaths and 452 injuries). 
 3. Gun Violence Archive 2019, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, 
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (this accounts for 
39,429 gun-related deaths and 29,652 gun-related injuries). 
 4. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, supra note 2, at 2 (The United States 
has a gun homicide rate of 4.1 per 100,000 residents. Compare this to Canada’s rate of just 0.3 per 
100,000 residents.). 
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Supreme Court decisions interpreting the scope of the Second 
Amendment frustrate the issue even further. 
In 1939, the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment 
to protect a citizen’s right to possess a firearm so long as that firearm 
was reasonably related to service in a militia.5 Subsequent federal 
court decisions interpreted the Second Amendment as “preserving the 
authority of the states to maintain militias.”6 In the years that followed, 
each state adopted its own system of gun-control laws.7 For nearly 
seventy years, the Supreme Court did not review any cases related to 
the Second Amendment.8 In 2008, the Court heard District of 
Columbia v. Heller,9 where it found that the Second Amendment 
“confers an individual right to possess a firearm for traditionally 
lawful purposes.”10 The Court reasoned, however, that while the 
federal government cannot violate this right, the right is not absolute 
and could be subject to regulation.11 Unfortunately, the Heller 
decision left much to be desired. While it was clear that the Second 
Amendment “protects the right of law-abiding citizens to possess 
weapons for lawful purposes,”12 there were no clearly defined 
principles by which lower courts could determine whether a purpose 
was in fact lawful. The Court has made it clear that the possession of 
a firearm in one’s home for self-defense is lawful.13 However, the 
Court has yet to address whether the possession of an operable firearm 
in public for self-defense is lawful. In the absence of clear authority 
on the subject, lower courts have begun to apply a two-part framework 
that approximates the Heller Court’s rationale.14 In 2010, the Court 
supplemented its Heller holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago,15 
 
 5. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 6. Luis Acosta, United States: Gun Ownership and the Supreme Court, LIBRARY OF CONG. 
(July 2008), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/second-amendment.php. 
 7. See Gun Law Navigator, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, 
https://everytownresearch.org/navigator/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 8. See Acosta, supra note 6. 
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10. Acosta, supra note 6. 
 11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–28. 
 12. SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 12 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44618.pdf. 
 13. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 14. PECK, supra note 12, at 12; see Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 
960–61 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit’s version of the two-part framework will be discussed 
in greater detail, infra Part III(B), notes 101–125. 
 15. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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finding that Second Amendment protections also apply against state 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
In Young v. Hawaii (Young II),17 the Ninth Circuit found that a 
Hawaii statute violated the protections of the Second Amendment as 
construed by the Supreme Court in Heller.18 This Comment will 
examine the Ninth Circuit’s rationale and explain why that rationale 
was incorrect. Part II of this Comment discusses the facts and holding 
of Young II. Part III discusses Second Amendment jurisprudence 
established by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in order to 
show the analytical process the Young II panel was bound to follow. 
Part IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Young II, in particular 
how the Ninth Circuit conducted its analysis of the history of the 
Second Amendment and the Ninth Circuit’s own two-part framework 
for alleged violations of the Second Amendment. The analysis in Part 
IV is accompanied by a critique of the panel’s analysis which applies 
the Ninth Circuit’s Second Amendment jurisprudence to Young II and 
explains why the Ninth Circuit should reinstate the district court’s 
holding when Young II is reheard en banc.19 
II.  YOUNG V. HAWAII 
A.  Procedural Posture 
On June 12, 2012, George K. Young, Jr. (“Young”) filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 
against the State of Hawaii, the Governor of the State of Hawaii, the 
State Attorney General (collectively, “State defendants”); and the 
County of Hawaii, William P. Kenoi in his capacity as Mayor of the 
County of Hawaii, the Hilo County Police Department, and Harry S. 
Kubojiri in his capacity as Chief of Police (“Hawaii County Chief of 
Police”) (collectively, “County defendants”).20 In his complaint, 
 
 16. Acosta, supra note 6. 
 17. 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(mem.). 
 18. Id. at 1074. 
 19. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc on February 8, 2019. See Young v. Hawaii 
(Young III), 915 F.3d 681, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). On January 22, 2019, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019) 
(mem.). The en banc proceedings in Young III have been stayed pending the Supreme Court’s 
issuance of an opinion in that case. See Order at 1, Young v. Hawaii, No. 12-17808 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 14, 2019), ECF No. 209. 
 20. See Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights at 1, Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972 
(D. Haw. 2012) (No. 12-00336), 2012 WL 489184. 
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Young alleged that Hawaii Revised Statute section 134-9 violated the 
rights guaranteed to him by the Second Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.21 Section 134-9 prohibited any person from 
publicly carrying an operable pistol or revolver, concealed or 
unconcealed, without a license.22 The law also outlined the process by 
which a United States citizen aged twenty-one or older could obtain 
the requisite license.23 Applicants were required to submit an 
application to “the chief of police of the appropriate county.”24 The 
local chiefs of police had discretion to issue these permits.25 Further, 
permits issued under section 134-9 were only valid “within the county 
where the license [was] granted.”26 
To obtain a concealed carry permit, an applicant had to first show 
“reason to fear injury to [his or her] person or property.”27 This 
preliminary finding was required regardless of which county the 
applicant submitted an application to.28 County chiefs of police were 
also expected to adopt procedures to verify that all those granted a 
concealed carry permit  
(1) Be qualified to use the firearm in a safe manner;  
(2) Appear to be a suitable person to be so licensed;  
(3) Not be prohibited under section 134-7 from the 
ownership or possession of a firearm; and  
(4) Not have been adjudged insane or not appear to be 
mentally deranged.29  
Thus, the county chief of police would carry out the adopted 
procedures to ascertain whether the applicant satisfied the additional 
four requirements only after the applicant had demonstrated reason to 
fear injury to his or her person or property. 
As for unconcealed carry permits, a county chief of police could 
only issue such permits to “applicant[s] of good moral character,” who 
 
 21. See Young v. Hawaii (Young I), 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d, 896 F.3d 
1044 (9th Cir. 2018). Young also asserted that section 134-9 violated various other provisions of 
the Constitution. Id. Because these claims were abandoned on appeal, they will not be discussed in 
this Comment. 
 22. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(c) (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 
2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 23. Id. § 134-9(a). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. § 134-9(b). 
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have sufficiently indicated “the urgency or the need,” and who were 
“engaged in the protection of life and property” and not otherwise 
“prohibited under section 134-7 from the ownership or possession of 
a firearm.”30 Put simply, unconcealed carry permits were reserved for 
law enforcement or security officers who needed to carry a firearm to 
protect life and property. Concealed carry permits, on the other hand, 
were reserved for any applicant, provided the applicant sufficiently 
demonstrated reason to fear injury to person or property. Thus, the 
success of an applicant’s unconcealed carry permit application 
depended on his or her employment, while the success of an 
applicant’s concealed carry permit application depended on his or her 
reason to fear injury. 
In accordance with section 134-9, Young applied for a permit on 
two occasions in 2011.31 Young applied for a permit “to carry a 
firearm, outside of the home, either concealed or unconcealed, stating 
the purpose being for personal security, self-preservation and defense, 
and protection of personal family members and property.”32 The 
Hawaii County Chief of Police denied both applications, stating that 
the chief of police may grant a permit “only in exceptional cases or a 
demonstrated urgency.”33 
The State and County defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
Young’s complaint.34 The court first found that Young’s suit against 
the State defendants was barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.35 Young’s claims against the County defendants were not, 
however, barred by sovereign immunity.36 The court found that Young 
had standing to bring his suit under the Second Amendment because 
the denial of a permit or license “pursuant to a state administrative 
scheme regulating firearms may constitute an actual and ongoing 
 
 30. Id. § 134-9(a). 
 31. See Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 13. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. Two portions of section 134-9 are relevant here. The first states that concealed carry 
permits may be issued in “an exceptional case, when an applicant shows reason to fear injury to the 
applicant’s person or property.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a) (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). The second states 
that unconcealed carry permits may be issued “[w]here the urgency or the need has been sufficiently 
indicated.” Id. 
 34. Young I, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 35. Id. at 981–84. 
 36. See id. at 984–92. 
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injury for infringing upon . . . [the] Second Amendment.”37 Having 
found that Young had standing to bring suit, the court proceeded to 
evaluate whether Young had stated a claim under the Second 
Amendment.38 
Relying on District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, the court determined that although the Second 
Amendment was not necessarily limited to bearing arms for self-
defense in the home, it did not confer “a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.”39 The court acknowledged that the Heller and McDonald 
decisions did not establish to what extent the Second Amendment 
extends beyond the home and the appropriate level of scrutiny by 
which to evaluate restrictions on the right to bear arms.40 The court 
then drew upon the two-step approach that several other circuits had 
adopted for evaluating Second Amendment challenges.41 The first step 
is to “determine whether the challenged law regulates activity that falls 
within the Second Amendment’s scope.”42 If the law does not regulate 
such activity, it does not violate the Second Amendment.43 Otherwise, 
the court then determines whether the regulation unconstitutionally 
burdens protected activity.44 
Under the first step of the inquiry, the district court found that the 
Second Amendment did not protect an absolute right to carry a firearm 
in public for two reasons.45 First, the court noted that the weight of 
authority amongst several circuits, including the Ninth Circuit and its 
district courts, favored a position that the Second Amendment confers 
a narrow right to keep an operable firearm for self-defense in the 
home.46 In particular, the court was convinced that a narrow 
interpretation was justified because an individual’s interest in self-
defense outside of the home is outweighed by public safety interests.47 
 
 37. Id. at 987 (first citing Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
aff’d, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); and then citing Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501–02 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011)). 
 38. See id. at 987. 
 39. Id. at 988 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 988–90. 
 46. Id. at 989. 
 47. See id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
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Additionally, the Hawaii statute did not act as a complete ban on 
carrying firearms, and other courts have upheld laws similar to the 
challenged Hawaii statute.48 In Hawaii, a gun owner is only permitted 
to keep a firearm at his or her residence, place of business, or sojourn 
but may lawfully transport the firearm between such places, as well as 
several other locations, such as shooting ranges.49 Gun owners 
generally are not permitted to possess loaded firearms on a public 
highway; however, individuals with a permit issued under section 134-
9 are exempt from that prohibition.50 The court determined that when 
viewed as part of Hawaii’s overall statutory scheme for gun 
regulation, section 134-9 did not operate as a complete ban or burden 
on gun ownership for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home.51 
In other words, the district court found that the possession of a 
handgun for self-defense outside of the home was not conduct within 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s constitutional protections. 
Having found that section 134-9 did not regulate conduct within 
the scope of the Second Amendment, the district court could have 
dismissed the case without moving on to the second step of the inquiry 
under ordinary circumstances. However, the Heller and McDonald 
opinions proved inconclusive as to the scope of the Second 
Amendment beyond self-defense in the home.52 In response, federal 
appellate courts “advised lower courts to await direction from the 
Supreme Court regarding the Second Amendment’s scope outside the 
home.”53 This requires that district courts proceed to the second step 
of the inquiry operating under the assumption that the conduct 
regulated is within the scope of the Second Amendment, even if the 
court has already determined that the conduct was not within the scope 
of the Second Amendment. In accordance with this directive, the court 
found that even if section 134-9 did regulate conduct within the scope 
of the Second Amendment’s protection, the statute would stand up to 
constitutional muster.54 To do so, the court applied the “intermediate 
scrutiny standard for the Second Amendment context” used by district 
 
 48. See id. at 989–90. 
 49. Id. at 990 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-23, -24, -25, -27 (2019)). 
 50. Id. (citing §§ 134-9, 26). 
 51. See id. (comparing section 134-9 with the statutes challenged in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)). 
 52. See id. at 988. 
 53. Id. at 990. 
 54. See id. 
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courts in the Ninth Circuit.55 To satisfy this standard, the regulation 
must further a “significant, substantial, or important” governmental 
objective, and the “regulation must reasonably fit the asserted 
objective.”56 The court found that Hawaii’s firearm carrying laws were 
implemented and enforced to promote the government’s “important 
and substantial interest” in protecting “the public from the inherent 
dangers of firearms.”57 The court then found that section 134-9 
reasonably fit this objective for three reasons.58 First, it allowed 
officials to “differentiate between individuals who need[ed] to carry a 
gun for self-defense and those who [did] not.”59 Second, it was not an 
outright ban on firearms.60 Finally, it only regulated handguns.61 In 
accordance with its findings, the court dismissed Young’s claim.62 
B.  Appellate Proceedings 
Young timely appealed the district court’s ruling, arguing that 
giving state and county officials discretion to issue permits under 
section 134-9 violated the Second Amendment because that statute 
was “the only means to bear arms in Hawaii.”63 It is unclear what 
Young meant by this assertion. The most convincing argument is 
perhaps that the permitting process outlined in section 134-9 afforded 
far too much deference to the chief of police in granting permits. 
However, section 134-9 was narrow in scope; it only regulated the 
licensing process for obtaining a permit to publicly carry handguns 
and did not interfere with an individual’s right to possess or bear a 
firearm within his or her home.64 On appeal, the County defendants 
emphasized that the Supreme Court’s narrow holdings in McDonald 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 991 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 992. 
 63. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 12-17808), 
2013 WL 663797. 
 64. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 
2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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and Heller reiterated much of the rationale the district court used to 
uphold section 134-9.65 
The panel began its analysis66 by mirroring the Heller Court’s 
approach of first analyzing the text of the Second Amendment and 
then looking to the contemporary understanding of the Second 
Amendment  shortly after the founding of the United States when it 
was ratified and during the period surrounding the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.67 The panel concluded that the text and 
historical context of the Second Amendment protected a right to 
openly carry a firearm in public for self-defense, and thus, section 134-
9 burdened conduct protected by the Second Amendment.68 Then, the 
panel went on to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to be 
applied.69 The panel utilized a sliding scale to evaluate the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.70 Laws that impose such a severe restriction on a core 
right of the Second Amendment which effectively destroy the right are 
unconstitutional under any standard of review.71 Courts apply strict 
scrutiny when a regulation severely burdens a core right of the Second 
Amendment.72 At the other extreme, regulations that do not severely 
burden a core right of the Second Amendment, but nonetheless burden 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment, are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.73 The panel relied on its earlier finding, that the 
Second Amendment protected a right to publicly carry a firearm for 
self-defense, and found that section 134-9 did affect a core right of the 
Second Amendment.74 The panel further found that section 134-9 
effectively destroyed that core right, and was therefore 
unconstitutional under any standard of review.75 Although the Young 
 
 65. Defendants-Appellees County of Hawai’i, William P. Kenoi & Harry S. Kubojiri’s 
Answering Brief at 5–6, Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 12-17808), 2013 WL 
2403526; see Young I, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 989–92. 
 66. The description that follows is a general overview of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Part IV 
provides a more in-depth analysis for each section of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 
 67. See Young II, 896 F.3d 1044, 1052–68 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 
681 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). 
 68. Id. at 1068. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (citing Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 71. Id. (citing Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 72. See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2013)). 
 73. See Young II, 896 F.3d at 1068 (citing Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961). 
 74. Id. at 1070. 
 75. Id. at 1071. 
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II panel relied on the appropriate authority, the majority opinion 
misapplied the standards prescribed by that authority. 
III.  SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Supreme Court Precedent 
1.  District of Columbia v. Heller 
To better understand the state of the law on the Second 
Amendment, it is essential to look to the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. 
Both decisions define the scope of the Second Amendment as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The decisions also provide trial 
courts with some guidance as to how alleged violations of the Second 
Amendment should be examined. 
In Heller, the Supreme Court found that the Second Amendment 
guaranteed an individual the “right to possess and carry weapons in 
case of confrontation.”76 The Court explicitly stated that this “right 
was not unlimited” and did not permit individuals “to carry arms for 
any sort of confrontation.”77 The Court elaborated, stating that its 
decision was narrow and would not place in doubt the validity of 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”78 
The Court then moved on to discuss the scope of the Second 
Amendment. The law challenged in Heller instituted an absolute ban 
on handgun possession in the home and required that any firearms kept 
lawfully in the home be rendered inoperable.79 The Court took issue 
with both prohibitions.80 The Court found that the ban on the 
possession of handguns in the home was unconstitutional for two 
reasons. First, “the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute” in the home.81 Second, a categorical ban on handguns, the 
 
 76. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
 77. Id. at 595. 
 78. Id. at 626–27. 
 79. Id. at 628. 
 80. See id. at 628–30. 
 81. Id. at 628. 
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weapon many consider to be the quintessential weapon for home 
defense, all but obliterated an individual’s Second Amendment right.82 
With respect to the requirement that any firearms kept in the home 
be rendered inoperable, the Court found that this too was 
unconstitutional because it made “it impossible for [individuals] to use 
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.”83 Based on this 
finding, the District of Columbia argued that the Court should read the 
statute to include an exception for self-defense, so as to avoid 
invalidating it as a whole.84 Unconvinced, the Court concluded that 
the existence of several other enumerated exceptions to the regulatory 
scheme suggested that an exception for self-defense should not be read 
into the statute.85 Based on the Court’s concern with failure to 
explicitly set forth an exception for self-defense, it is possible that the 
law at issue and others like it would survive constitutional muster so 
long as the law clearly provides an exception for the lawful purpose of 
self-defense. Unfortunately, the Court did not establish a cognizable 
standard of review by which courts are to examine Second 
Amendment challenges. However, it drew two conclusions. First, any 
categorical ban on handgun possession in the home violates the 
Second Amendment.86 Second, any requirement that lawful firearms 
in the home be rendered inoperable so that they cannot be used for the 
lawful purpose of self-defense violates the Second Amendment.87 
2.  McDonald v. City of Chicago 
The Supreme Court clarified the extent of the Second 
Amendment’s protections two years after Heller in McDonald, where 
a city ordinance effectively banned possession of handguns both 
inside and outside the home.88 The Court acknowledged that, like the 
rest of the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment clearly proscribed 
federal regulation of conduct protected by the amendment.89 In fact, 
Chief Justice Marshall plainly stated that the framers had intended that 
the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights only act as limitations 
 
 82. See id. at 628–29. 
 83. Id. at 630. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 635. 
 87. Id. 
 88. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010). 
 89. Id. at 754. 
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on the federal government and not the states.90 After the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court began to incorporate portions 
of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.91 Relying on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found that the Second 
Amendment “right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our 
[nation’s] scheme of ordered liberty.”92 The Court emphasized that the 
incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states does not 
eliminate their ability to regulate conduct protected by the right but 
rather limits that ability.93 The Court also reassured state governments 
that the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states did 
not effectively destroy every existing regulation of firearms.94 The 
Court’s holding may be summed up in one sentence: “the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller” is incorporated against the 
states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.95 
Limiting the Heller and McDonald decisions to their facts, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that two types of regulations on 
firearms are facially unconstitutional: categorical bans on handgun 
ownership and prohibitions on keeping operable firearms in the home. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the Second Amendment protects the 
possession of operable firearms, including handguns, outside the 
home. The Court also did not explain why certain longstanding 
regulations would be undisturbed by its decisions.96 This was the 
precise question raised at trial in Young I—whether section 134-9’s 
regulation of the possession of operable firearms outside the home ran 
afoul of Young’s Second Amendment right to bear arms.97 The district 
court in Young I proposed two possible interpretations, both of which 
are convincing.98 The first was that these regulations proscribed 
conduct that was not protected by the Second Amendment.99 The 
second was that although these regulations burdened conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment, the regulations passed 
 
 90. See id. (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833)). 
 91. See id. at 759–61. 
 92. Id. at 767 (emphasis omitted). 
 93. See id. at 784–85. 
 94. See id. at 786. 
 95. Id. at 791. 
 96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008). 
 97. Young I, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 98. See id. at 990–91. 
 99. Id. at 990. 
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constitutional muster.100 Thus, it is evident that certain regulations 
which do burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment pass 
constitutional muster. Unfortunately, the lack of a predetermined 
standard of review makes ascertaining whether or not a law violates 
the Second Amendment even more challenging. The Supreme Court 
has yet to establish the level of scrutiny trial courts are expected to 
apply to firearms regulations challenged on the grounds that they 
violate the Second Amendment. This has led to varying approaches 
amongst the circuit courts. To properly evaluate the Ninth Circuit’s 
Young II holding, it is essential to understand how the Ninth Circuit 
evaluates Second Amendment challenges. 
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Two-Step Inquiry 
The Ninth Circuit’s leading cases on Second Amendment 
challenges are United States v. Chovan101 and Jackson v. City and 
County of San Francisco.102 Chovan collected the approaches other 
circuit courts had taken and ultimately applied the two-step inquiry 
many other circuit courts had applied.103 The first step of the inquiry 
“asks whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the 
Second Amendment.”104 If the answer is in the affirmative, the court 
must move on to the second step of the inquiry—to determine the 
“appropriate level of scrutiny” and apply it to the challenged law.105 
The Supreme Court found that rational basis review is not an 
appropriate level of scrutiny for laws that burden conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment.106 Therefore, such laws are evaluated under 
either intermediate or strict scrutiny.107 
The Ninth Circuit determines the appropriate level of scrutiny by 
balancing two factors.108 The first factor is “how close the law comes 
to the core of the Second Amendment right.”109 The Ninth Circuit has 
 
 100. Id. at 991. 
 101. 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 102. 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 103. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. 
 104. Id. This step appears fairly easy to satisfy; it seems as though the first step is satisfied as 
long as the challenged law regulates firearm possession in any manner whatsoever.  
 105. Id. 
 106. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008); see Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1137. 
 107. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. 
 108. See id. at 1138 (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 109. Id. 
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interpreted the core of the Second Amendment right as “the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.”110 For instance, in Chovan, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
challenged law did not come close to the core of the Second 
Amendment right because it prohibited the possession of firearms by 
domestic violence misdemeanants who are not “law-abiding citizens” 
within the definition set forth in Heller.111 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the challenged law in Jackson came close to the core 
of the Second Amendment right because it gave handgun owners two 
alternatives while in their own homes: either carry their gun on their 
person at all times or store it in a locked container or with a trigger 
lock.112 
The second factor looks to “the severity of the law’s burden on 
the right.”113 Laws that only regulate the manner in which an 
individual may exercise their Second Amendment right are less 
burdensome than laws that prohibit firearm possession altogether.114 
In Chovan, for example, the challenged law was deemed to impose a 
substantial burden because it prohibited a particular class of persons 
from possessing any firearm, although the existence of several 
exemptions to the law lessened the severity of that burden.115 
However, in Jackson, the challenged law was not considered a severe 
burden because it only burdened the manner in which a person could 
exercise their Second Amendment right, requiring handgun owners in 
their own homes to lock their weapons when not carried on their 
person, rather than absolutely prohibiting the possession of 
handguns.116 
This process creates a spectrum of alternative approaches under 
which courts in the Ninth Circuit may evaluate Second Amendment 
claims.117 On one extreme, laws that strike at the core of the Second 
Amendment right and impose such a severe burden on the exercise of 
that right “‘amount[ ] to a destruction of the . . . right,’ [and] [are] 
 
 110. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). As noted earlier, many courts are reluctant to expand 
the holding in Heller beyond the possession of firearms in the home for self-defense. See supra text 
accompanying note 46. 
 111. See Chovan, 753 F.3d at 1138; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 112. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 113. Chovan, 753 F.3d at 1138. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964–65. 
 117. See id. at 961. 
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unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”118 In the middle are laws 
that come close to the core of the Second Amendment right and 
impose a severe burden but do not amount to a destruction of the 
right.119 Such laws are presumably subject to strict scrutiny.120 
At the other end of the spectrum are laws that either do not come 
close to the core of the Second Amendment right or do not impose a 
severe burden on the exercise of the right.121 These laws are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny and thus require that the regulation furthers an 
important, significant, or substantial governmental objective and that 
the regulation is substantially related to that objective.122 Furthermore, 
it would appear that neither factor on its own is sufficient to warrant 
strict scrutiny. By way of example, the Chovan court found that the 
law was a severe burden on conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment but that the core of the Second Amendment was not 
implicated.123 In contrast, the Jackson court found that the law 
implicated the core of the Second Amendment but did not severely 
burden the Second Amendment right.124 Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit analyzed both laws under intermediate scrutiny.125 
IV.  THE YOUNG II PANEL’S APPROACH: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
There are two aspects of the Young II panel’s opinion in particular 
that prove troublesome. The first is the panel’s expansion of the scope 
of the Second Amendment right to apply outside the home. The second 
is the panel’s application of the Ninth Circuit’s two-step inquiry for 
Second Amendment challenges. 
A.  Expansion of the Second Amendment Right 
The Young II panel held that the core of the Second Amendment 
encapsulates not only the right to possess a firearm within one’s home 
for self-defense but also the right to openly carry a firearm in public 
 
 118. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)). 
 119. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at 1138–40. 
 123. See supra notes 111, 115 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 112, 116 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 
965 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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for self-defense.126 The panel did so by emulating the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Heller and McDonald: first looking to the text of the 
Second Amendment, then moving on to the history of judicial 
interpretations of the right to bear arms.127 One troubling aspect of the 
panel’s historical analysis was its strong emphasis on the right to bear 
arms in the antebellum South, presenting the views of only two reports 
which criticized discriminatory policies restricting the right to bear 
arms of recently freed slaves.128 What was strikingly absent from the 
panel’s discussion was an analysis of the primary criticism contained 
within the reports. There are two liberty concerns implicated in 
prohibiting liberated slaves from possessing firearms. The first is 
whether this was an assault on the Second Amendment right itself. The 
second is the fact that these laws categorically denied a class of 
persons, newly freed slaves, their right to bear arms. However, the 
panel did not address which of these concerns was at the center of the 
reports. It is unclear whether the reports were concerned with the 
negative impact such laws would have on the Second Amendment 
right in the future or with the fact that the class of newly freed slaves 
received differential treatment. Furthermore, language from one report 
emphasized that freedmen needed firearms to hunt.129 The panel did 
not, however, highlight the portions of these reports that stressed the 
need to bear arms for self-defense. Surely the panel would have 
referenced such discussions if they existed, for those statements would 
be invaluable evidence supporting the panel’s position. 
Putting aside the inherent problems with the panel’s historical 
analysis, the panel should not have even conducted such a review 
because the circuit had implicitly resolved this very issue in a recent 
decision.130 In Peruta v. County of San Diego,131 the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a good cause restriction on obtaining a concealed carry permit 
in California.132 A good cause restriction is a type of firearm regulation 
requiring that applications show that the applicant has “good cause” 
 
 126. See Young II, 896 F.3d 1044, 1074 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 
(9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). 
 127. Id. at 1052–68. 
 128. See id. at 1054–61. 
 129. Id. at 1061. 
 130. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 929–39 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 131. 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 132. Id. at 924. 
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to carry a firearm.133 The definition of “good cause” can vary based 
on the law that instituted the regulation. For instance, the California 
law at issue in Peruta gave county sheriffs authority to establish and 
publish policies that defined good cause.134 The sheriffs of San Diego 
and Yolo Counties defined good cause as “a particularized reason why 
an applicant need[ed] a concealed firearm for self-defense.”135 This is 
similar to section 134-9’s requirement that an applicant for a 
concealed carry permit must show reason to fear injury to his or her 
person or property.136 
The court was careful to limit the scope of its findings, holding 
that the decision only applied to the carrying of concealed firearms in 
public, and not on the right to openly carry firearms in public.137 While 
the matter of openly carrying a firearm in public was not the issue in 
Peruta, the court acknowledged the nature of California’s firearm 
regulations, which encapsulate policies for openly carrying a firearm 
in public and for carrying a concealed firearm in public.138 California 
firearms regulations permit concealed carry of firearms in public upon 
a showing of good cause, while the right to openly carry firearms is 
restricted, almost to the point of prohibition, with some exceptions.139 
These exceptions are fairly narrow, applying only to peace officers, 
security guards, and individuals with similar occupations who have 
completed firearms training; hunters and fishermen while engaged in 
hunting or fishing; and individuals transporting unloaded firearms to 
and from a firing range.140 Once again, this is similar to section 134-9 
in that section 134-9 also limited the issuance of public carry permits 
to those who had a need to possess a firearm in order to engage in the 
protection of property or persons.141 Taken together, this suggests that 
the court found that imposing a good cause requirement on the right 
to carry a concealed firearm was not unconstitutional, even though 
obtaining a concealed carry permit was the only way an individual 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 
2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 137. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942. 
 138. Id. at 925. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 
2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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who did not fall under the statutory exceptions could carry a firearm 
in public.142 
The California regulatory scheme analyzed in Peruta bears a 
great deal of similarity to the Hawaii regulatory scheme scrutinized in 
Young II. In fact, section 134-9 was far less restrictive than the law 
challenged in Peruta. Whereas section 134-9 only applied to 
handguns, a single class of firearms, California’s laws apply to all 
classes of firearms, not just handguns.143 Thus, it is unclear how the 
Young II panel felt it could contravene the existing circuit precedent 
in Peruta which had implicitly resolved the same question under 
similar circumstances concerning a law that covered a broader class of 
firearms. 
B.  Applying the Appropriate Standard of Review 
Even assuming that the Young II panel was correct in expanding 
the Second Amendment right beyond the home, the panel applied the 
improper standard of review. The panel held that section 134-9 was 
unconstitutional altogether because it struck directly at the core of the 
Second Amendment right and imposed such a severe burden on that 
right that it effectively destroyed this newfound right to carry a firearm 
openly in public.144 The panel majority criticized the dissent’s view 
that good cause requirements on open public carry, like section 134-
9, did not amount to a destruction of the Second Amendment right and 
should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.145 The dissent’s 
primary point was that section 134-9 did not foreclose citizens from 
publicly carrying a firearm in public for self-defense, thus circuit 
precedent would suggest that the regulation was “less likely to place a 
severe burden on the Second Amendment right.”146 Though 
persuasive, the majority hastily dismissed the dissent’s argument.147 
The majority found that section 134-9 effectively prohibited concealed 
 
 142. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 925. 
 143. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2019), invalidated by Young II, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th 
Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the process to obtain a 
permit to carry a loaded handgun in public), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 25850 (West 2012) (“A 
person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person 
or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street.”). 
 144. See Young II, 896 F.3d 1044, 1071 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 
(9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). 
 145. Id. at 1071–72. 
 146. Id. at 1081 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 1072 (majority opinion). 
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carry of firearms in public because no concealed carry license had ever 
been issued by the county.148 Yet, while the majority claimed that “the 
dissent must shut its eyes” to this fact, the majority itself averted its 
eyes from the multiple reasons this could be the case.149 While it may 
be true that no permit had ever been issued, the majority failed to 
provide context to this fact. There was no discussion of how many 
applicants had previously applied for such a permit. There was no 
examination of why these earlier applications were denied. There was 
not even an argument that the prior denials were arbitrary. The 
majority made it a point to chide the dissent for ignoring a fact while 
it too failed to provide the context that would make that fact 
significant. 
The majority continued, correctly noting that section 134-9 
lacked any provision granting administrative or judicial review to the 
denial of a permit, unlike some other good cause regimes which had 
been upheld.150 The majority criticized the dissent’s view that the 
record in the case was insufficient to place the law’s “good cause” 
element in question at the motion to dismiss stage.151 The majority’s 
criticism was inadequate. Noticeably absent from Young’s complaint 
and the subsequent moving papers were allegations that he satisfied 
the exceptional case portion of the statute; he merely emphasized his 
generalized purpose for applying.152 On appeal, Young implied that he 
had been denied the permit because the Hawaii County Chief of Police 
had found he was unqualified.153 However, there was no evidence that 
the Hawaii County Chief of Police denied Young’s application 
because he found Young was unqualified.154 Rather, it appears 
Young’s application was denied because he failed to establish that he 
had the requisite reason to fear injury for a concealed carry permit or 
to sufficiently indicate an urgency or need to obtain an unconcealed 
carry permit.155 In his own complaint, Young described the basis of 
his application in general terms, “for personal security, self-
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. 
 152.  Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 13. 
 153. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 63, at 4.  
 154. Id. Indeed, even if this was the basis for Young’s denial, the opening brief merely stated 
that Young was qualified without any explanation of the qualifications he possessed. Id. 
 155. See Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 13. 
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preservation and defense, and protection of personal family members 
and property.”156   
Perhaps the most significant challenge to the panel majority’s 
decision is its failure to follow its own circuit precedent for evaluating 
challenged gun-control laws. Under the Ninth Circuit’s Second 
Amendment jurisprudence, challenged gun-control laws are subject to 
a two-step inquiry. The panel majority found that the law was 
unconstitutional on its face, yet the opinion was devoid of any detailed 
discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s well-established two-step inquiry as 
applied to the facts in Young I. No court applying the Ninth Circuit’s 
two-step inquiry could come to such a conclusion absent a thorough 
examination of what the law regulated and how it did so. 
1.  Application of the Ninth Circuit’s Two-Step Inquiry 
The Ninth Circuit determines the appropriate level of scrutiny in 
challenges to gun-control laws by analyzing “how close the law comes 
to the core of the Second Amendment right” and “the severity of the 
law’s burden on the right.”157 Under the inquiry, there are three 
possible outcomes: the law effectively destroys the Second 
Amendment right and is facially unconstitutional,158 the law severely 
burdens the core of the right and is subject to strict scrutiny,159 and the 
law either does not come close to the core of the right or does not 
severely burden the exercise of the right and is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.160 
Prior to Young II, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the core of the 
Second Amendment right as “the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”161 However, the 
panel majority believed that the core of the Second Amendment was 
not limited to self-defense within the home and also included self-
defense in public. This Comment will not belabor the bounds of the 
core of the Second Amendment right; the Supreme Court is likely to 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 158. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 159. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 1138–40. 
 161. Id. at 1138 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
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resolve this question by the conclusion of its 2019 term.162 Assuming 
the panel was correct in finding that the right to openly carry a firearm 
in public was within the core of the Second Amendment right, circuit 
precedent nonetheless demanded that the majority analyze whether 
section 134-9 imposed such a severe burden on the right that it 
effectively destroyed it. The panel merely said that the law destroyed 
that right but did not conduct a sincere analysis of the severity of the 
burden. 
Laws that only regulate the manner in which an individual may 
exercise their Second Amendment right are less burdensome than laws 
prohibiting firearm possession altogether.163 Much like the laws at 
issue in Chovan and Jackson, section 134-9 did not act as a blanket 
prohibition on the possession of firearms. Section 134-9 bears more 
similarity to the laws challenged in Chovan and Jackson because it 
merely regulated the manner in which an individual may openly carry 
a firearm—only after obtaining a permit from local law enforcement 
authorities. Moreover, section 134-9 was far from similar to the laws 
struck down by the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. Both of 
those laws absolutely prohibited the possession of operable handguns, 
even within one’s own home. 
There are two points of divergence between section 134-9 and the 
laws struck down in Heller and McDonald that are particularly helpful 
in understanding why section 134-9 did not severely burden the 
Second Amendment right. First, the geographic scope of the 
regulation: in Heller and McDonald, the challenged laws purported to 
regulate handgun possession everywhere, including one’s own private 
property. In contrast, section 134-9 applied only to handgun 
possession in public. Second, the nature of the regulation: the 
challenged laws in Heller and McDonald were categorical 
prohibitions on handgun possession with few exceptions. Section 134-
9, however, merely established qualifications for carrying a handgun 
in public and procedures by which a person could demonstrate that he 
or she had met those qualifications. Section 134-9 only regulated how 
an individual may exercise their Second Amendment right. Moreover, 
it did not come close to a prohibition on handgun possession in public. 
 
 162. Docket Search Results: No. 18-280, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/18-
280.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 163. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
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Therefore, it did not severely burden the core of the Second 
Amendment as expanded by the Young II majority. This, in turn, 
means that section 134-9 was not facially unconstitutional and should 
have been analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. 
2.  Subjecting Section 134-9 to Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Ninth Circuit’s intermediate scrutiny test for regulations that 
allegedly violate the Second Amendment has two components. First, 
courts determine whether the regulation furthers a significant 
government objective.164 Then, if the law furthers such an objective, 
the court determines whether the regulation reasonably fits that 
objective.165 As the district court explained, the Hawaii legislature’s 
objective in enacting section 134-9 was to protect the public from the 
danger posed by firearms.166 The Supreme Court has held that 
protecting the public’s safety is “unquestionably at the core of [a] 
[s]tate’s police power.”167 Furthermore, the Court has noted that a 
state’s exercise of its police powers is presumptively valid, provided 
that it does not otherwise offend the Constitution.168 Thus, a gun-
control regulation designed to protect the safety of the public is 
unquestionably a regulation designed to further a significant 
government objective. 
Having determined that section 134-9 furthers a significant 
government objective, the next step in the inquiry is to determine 
whether it reasonably fits that objective. It should be of no surprise 
that some states have taken legislative measures to protect their 
citizens from the dangers of gun violence, a persistent public safety 
concern. Handguns in particular account for the vast majority of gun-
related homicides.169 Section 134-9 addressed this danger by isolating 
handguns as a class and regulating the possession of that class of 
firearms in public. A law that only regulates who may carry a handgun 
in public is undoubtedly a reasonable fit for achieving the objective of 
 
 164. Young I, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 991 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. Gun violence statistics certainly justify the state’s concern. See Gun Violence Archive 
2019, supra note 3. In 2019 alone there have been 39,429 deaths attributable to firearms. Id. 
 167. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). 
 168. Id. at 247–48. 
 169. See Expanded Homicide Data Table 8, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME 
REPORTING, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/expanded-
homicide-data-table-8.xls (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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enhanced public safety. Thus, under the appropriate standard of 
review, section 134-9 would have been upheld. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The panel majority in Young II suggested that the Supreme Court 
clearly defined the extent of the Second Amendment in its Heller and 
McDonald decisions. This could not be further from the truth. The 
Court did undeniably resolve the question of whether the Second 
Amendment protects the right to possess an operable handgun within 
one’s own home for the purpose of self-defense. After Heller, circuit 
courts began to adopt their own frameworks for addressing Second 
Amendment challenges, with the clear trend being the two-step 
inquiry,170 which the Ninth Circuit also follows. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s equivocations in Heller have made applying any sort of 
uniform inquiry difficult. The likely result is future inconsistent 
rulings in courts across the country. To resolve this concern, there are 
three things the Supreme Court must do. First, it must settle the 
discrepancy among circuits by adopting a standard of review for 
Second Amendment challenges. Given the trend amongst the circuits, 
the two-step inquiry is perhaps best suited to address these issues 
because it balances the right as it is understood against the regulatory 
scope of the law. The inquiry provides for an appropriate standard of 
review depending on the outcome of the balancing analysis, which is 
necessarily a fact specific inquiry. This effectively calls upon courts 
to first determine which facet of the Second Amendment right is 
implicated and then to evaluate the substantive impact the challenged 
law has on the right. 
In addition to adopting a uniform standard of review for the 
Second Amendment, the Court must clarify the scope of the right. 
While Heller made it clear that the core of the right included 
possession of a handgun in the home for self-defense, it did not define 
what else the core of the right included. In the absence of clear 
guidance, the panel majority in Young II took it upon themselves to 
extend the core of the right beyond the threshold of the home to permit 
the open carry of a handgun in public for self-defense without a permit. 
This failure to clearly define the core of the right has created a 
dangerous slippery slope. If a circuit court decided that all individuals 
 
 170. PECK, supra note 12, at 12. 
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have the right to possess a handgun in public for self-defense without 
a license, the concern is what comes next. May all drivers of passenger 
vehicles now carry handguns on their person? Are assault rifles self-
defense weapons? What about rifles in the possession of game hunters 
en route to their hunting grounds? The vague bounds of the right set 
out in Heller offer no clear guidance for lower courts. 
As the top judicial authority in the nation, it is the Supreme 
Court’s responsibility to reconcile diverging opinions amongst the 
circuit courts, as inconsistent standards have developed, to ensure 
uniform application of the laws. This is particularly important when 
the law in question is part of the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the reluctance 
to draw a bright line stems from a desire to adhere to the original intent 
of the framers, who were themselves far from clear in their intent. 
While this desire is understandable, it is undeniable that the 
technology of today differs vastly from that of the late eighteenth 
century. Today, there is a multitude of firearms available for a variety 
of purposes: home defense, hunting, military use—the list goes on. 
Each of these weapons varies in their ammunition capacity and their 
destructive capabilities. Yet this arsenal of weaponry was not 
available, and quite possibly inconceivable, at the founding. There was 
but a single standard issue firearm amongst members of the 
continental army: the single shot musket. This very same weapon used 
in the fight for our nation’s independence was the same weapon used 
by colonists in defense of home and for hunting. Thus, it is erroneous 
to impute such an expansive view of the Second Amendment to the 
framers because of the significant variance between the technological 
realities of their time and those of the modern era. 
Finally, the Court must clarify what limitations on the right are 
permissible. In Heller, the Court noted that several longstanding 
firearm restrictions, including prohibitions on carrying firearms in 
certain locations, possession of firearms by certain classes of people, 
and imposing qualifications for commercial sales of firearms, would 
be unaffected.171 Though the Court was silent as to why these 
prohibitions would remain intact, each of these regulations furthers an 
important government interest: the preservation of the public’s safety. 
For example, the Heller Court noted that regulations imposing 
qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms are presumptively 
 
 171. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
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lawful.172 Today, however, gun sales can be consummated online by 
unlicensed vendors.173 Even more startling than off-market sales is the 
availability of blueprints to create a 3D-printed gun within the 
confines of one’s own home.174 The gun is untraceable by authorities 
and requires no background check.175 While there certainly is a 
distinction between regulation of the possession of firearms and 
imposing qualifications on the sale of firearms, the goal is the same—
ensuring that firearms do not come into possession of individuals who 
should not possess them. However, when individuals can easily take 
advantage of gaps in the law and circumvent regulations by way of 
off-market transactions or self-manufacturing, the regulations fail to 
do what they are designed to do—keep Americans safe. Thus, states 
must turn to regulations that restrict the areas where individuals may 
carry firearms. This is perhaps the reason why some states find 
restrictions on the possession of firearms in public to be a workable 
alternative—because imposing qualifications on vendors who sell 
firearms is simply ineffective at achieving the ultimate goal of 
maintaining the safety of their citizens. Thus, it is imperative that the 
Court clarify what kinds of regulations severely burden the right to 
bear arms. Based on the majority opinion in Heller, it seems 
reasonable that a regulation imposing qualifications on one’s ability to 
possess a firearm would not severely burden the right, provided that 
the regulation does not amount to a prohibition, excepting, of course, 
for certain extenuating circumstances. 
Gun violence is a serious concern to the American public, a harsh 
reality that affects Americans every single day. No legislation, court 
ruling, or executive order is likely to change that fact overnight. 
Furthermore, there will always be those who believe gun-control 
regulations go too far, and those who argue that the regulations do not 
go far enough. The plain language of the Second Amendment has 
yielded an amorphous right, one that would benefit from clarity. 
Congress has proven to be ineffective at passing any meaningful gun-
control legislation time and time again. Thus, the responsibility to 
clarify the bounds of the Second Amendment falls on the Supreme 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Gun Laws, Loopholes, and Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, https://www.bradyunited.org/issue/laws-and-loopholes (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 174. Emerging Dangers, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
https://www.bradyunited.org/issue/emerging-dangers (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 175. Id. 
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Court by way of its power to interpret the Constitution. An established 
analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges and 
clarification on the extent of the right would give Congress and state 
legislatures a concrete understanding of the Second Amendment. A 
defined Second Amendment standard will enable legislative bodies to 
focus on how a proposed policy best protects the American people 
from the dangers of gun violence and not belabor the potential 
constitutional challenges to that policy. 
